The Russo-Ukrainian War has been grinding on for more than a year now
with no end in sight. There’ve been hundreds of thousands of casualties.
Millions have been displaced from their homes. Besides death and injury,
there’s been massive destruction of infrastructure and environmental harm as
well.
Those of us who are active supporters of peace and seek a just resolution for
this conflict are facing some difficult questions. Every war is tragic, but
this one is uniquely dangerous, as, beyond the horrors it has already
presented, it also holds the potential for “going nuclear,” which could usher
in World War III. Here’s some of what we, at Peaceworks, are thinking about
where we find ourselves today and how we might reach that resolution.
Background:
While there is much disagreement as to who is mainly to blame, and at least as
much over the question where do we go from here, there is fairly broad
agreement that the Russian attack on Ukraine is a war of aggression, a profound
violation of international law. Even those who cast much of the blame for the
war onto the United States and NATO, begin their statements on the conflict
with a perfunctory condemnation of Russia’s launching of the war.
With this point of departure, what remains of the peace movement is divided as
to how much blame is to be cast on our government and NATO. Some focus on the
broken promise of not expanding NATO eastward, ostensibly made at the end of
the Cold War, although never codified in a treaty. And some question the very basis
for the continued existence of NATO when the Warsaw Pact dissolved more than 30
years ago.
Complicating the situation in Eastern Europe is the fact that Czarist Russia
and its successor, the Soviet Union, were both polyglot empires. Russia was not
only the dominant player in the Czarist empire, but there was a
many-decades-long Russification effort. This and colonization/migration led to
the USSR having significant Russian speaking minorities in virtually all of the
European Soviet republics, and some regions, including Crimea and the Donbass
in Ukraine, being majority Russian speaking. Putin is widely seen as attempting
to restore the former Russian Empire by annexing states or regions of states
that had become independent at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991.
There also is disagreement as to the causes of the armed conflict that began in
2014. At issue is the U.S. role in the Maidan Revolution. The government of Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych, which was democratically elected and tilted toward
Russia, was ousted in a popular uprising, with Yanukovych fleeing to Russia.
How much the U.S. supported this effort, or even directed it, is widely
disputed. So is the role that extreme nationalist forces, including neo-Nazis,
played in the revolt.
Over the past nine years Crimea has been annexed to Russia, a territorial
transfer that has not been recognized by most of the world’s nations, and
portions of the Donbass have been effectively self-governing. After Maidan, there
was initially significant fighting, but, within several months, the Minsk
Agreements were hammered out that ramped down the conflict. But there was
continuing sporadic fighting and Ukraine never recognized the separation of
either Crimea or the portions of the Donbass that were in Russian hands. The
Ukrainian government did agree to autonomy for the separatist regions. Both
sides, however, questioned the other’s compliance with these agreements.
The U.S. Role:
As noted, despite the end of the Cold War, the U.S. took a leading role in maintaining
and expanding the NATO alliance, even though the rationale for its existence
was to serve as a defensive anti-Soviet alliance. Rather than integrating all
of Eastern Europe into a system of regional cooperation—one that included
Russia as well as the West—U.S. foreign policy remained locked into maintaining
Russia as an enemy. This played out against a backdrop of Russia’s economy
being severely diminished in the wake of privatization.
The U.S. supported integration into NATO of all the Eastern European Warsaw
Pact nations as well as the Baltic republics. The U.S. was also involved in
supporting anti-Russian governments in other former Soviet republics, including
Georgia. In the wake of 9/11 Russia was very helpful to U.S. efforts, and did
not object to the U.S. military operating out of Central Asian former Soviet
republics.
Despite Russian efforts to curry U.S. favor, our government, under both Ds and
Rs, continued to pursue dominence, claiming to be the indispensable country in
a unipolar world. This served the interests of the Military-Industrial Complex,
but not the cause of peace.
The U.S. under George W. Bush, withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty. Later, under Trump, our government withdrew from the Intermediate
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This combined with the failure by all nuclear
weapons states to comply with the disarmament provisions in the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the failure to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the current Russian backing away from the New START
Treaty, leaves us with virtually no framework for managing nuclear arsenals or
reducing the risk of nuclear war.
Since the end of the Cold War, three decades ago, the U.S. has asserted and
sought to maintain the role of global hegemon. With more than 800 military
installations outside American borders and a military budget larger than the
next nine biggest spenders combined, the U.S. is the world’s largest exporter
of weapons of all types. Operating largely with cost-plus contracts, the
Military-Industrial Complex is highly profitable and it is one sector of the
manufacturing economy that the U.S. has not offshored.
That said, China and other emerging economies have come to regard the U.S. as a
fading power. Not one war the U.S. has fought since World War II resulted in a
clear victory and most have been undeniable defeats. Economic growth here lags
behind much of the world and our government’s interventionist policies have played
out to be more a sign of weakness than strength.
President Biden’s administration has attempted to portray the U.S. support for
Ukraine as a noble crusade to support democracy over autocracy. They have
presented the conflict as a stand-alone event; viewing it out of a broader
context. Moreover, it’s hard to take seriously their claims of supporting
democracy after many decades of making similar claims, from Vietnam to
Afghanistan and in numerous interventions in-between. Likewise, it’s hard to condemn
an illegal war of aggression in Ukraine, when the U.S. has invaded many
countries, most notably in recent years, Iraq. It is not surprising then that
much of the world views the U.S. role in the current conflict as suspect; an
attempted power grab, aimed at bringing down Russia, dressed up as a noble
crusade.
In discussing the war, the word that comes up most frequently is “intractable.” Both sides, it seems, are committed to winning; attaining an outright military victory. While the peace community continues to call for a ceasefire and negotiations, the Russians have set out unacceptable preconditions and the Ukrainians are unwilling to come to the table while the Russians occupy their territory.
Absent negotiations, the war is likely to drag on. In the long run, the Russians have significant factors operating in their favor, including a larger population, a larger resource base and the ability to both produce and purchase weapons. The Ukrainians have the advantage when it comes to motivation—they are defending their country and fighting off an invader—as well as, for now at least, access to sophisticated weapons systems from the U.S. and other NATO countries. That said, Russia holds the nuclear trump card. If things go poorly for them, they could fall back upon, not just the threat, but the actual use of tactical nuclear weapons.
The Ukrainians, whose fall counter-offensive was quite successful, seem convinced that the only way out acceptable to them is a powerful spring and summer advance that leads to a Russian defeat. It seems unlikely, however, that the Russians will accept defeat, and this makes the Ukrainian insistence on pursing victory most dangerous. Likewise, the Ukrainians are unlikely to accept defeat and it is likely, if their conventional military is vanquished, that there will be protracted popular resistance and guerilla warfare.
To Arm or Not to Arm?
Peace advocates are generally opposed to adding weapons to an existing conflict, often describing it as adding gasoline to a fire. That said, the Ukrainians are the aggrieved party—their country has been invaded and occupied—and they have the right to self-defense.
There is also disagreement as to what is likely to occur if the West is to shut down the flow of arms to Ukraine. Some say this will lead to peace, but it seems to us that Russia is less likely to come to the bargaining table if they know that the Ukrainian forces are running out of ordinance and likely to be defeated in short order. For this reason, while we mourn the loss of life and limb that will come with the use of these weapons, we recognize that the route to a ceasefire and negotiations is most likely taken if both sides recognize that they are unlikely to see a military victory, or that the cost of such a victory is just way too high.
What we would suggest instead is that, while pressing for negotiations, the West continues to supply weapons, but avoids escalating the conflict by supplying more capable or clearly offensive weapons. If NATO does this, it provides leverage with both the Ukrainian government and with the Russians, pressing both to lay down their arms and negotiating a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
What
Might a Peace Agreement Look Like?
A peace agreement should not be imposed from the outside, but it is possible
for our government to influence the terms of an agreement by the parties. In doing
so, in our opinion, they should embrace the principle that aggression should
not be rewarded and this includes transferring of territory. Further, we should
support the right to self-determination for all peoples.
This could be accomplished through an agreement to halt fighting, withdraw
forces from the conflict zones, put these regions under temporary UN control, while
enforcing the agreement by stationing peacekeepers from neutral parties. Each
providence, or oblast, with a large or majority Russian speaking population
should be given the opportunity to choose their own future.
Self-determination can be achieved through internationally supervised elections
or plebiscites. These should be held after a reasonable interval, perhaps a
year, to allow time to restore order and for refugees to return, should they
choose to. Those who have fled the fighting should also have the right to vote
absentee. The ballot could offer several options, ranging from integration into
Ukraine or Russia to autonomous status within either country, to independence. Voting
would be by oblast. Results should be based upon a ranked-choice vote, to assure
outcomes that conform to the will of the majority. And safeguards should be put
in place to guarantee the rights of minorities.
Security guarantees, including whether or not Ukraine will join NATO and/or the
EU also need to be decided. There are many additional issues that need to be
addressed, from reparations for the massive damages and losses imposed upon
Ukraine to the return of those, including children, who’ve been transferred away
from their homes against their will. Each of these issues must be negotiated,
but this will be easier to do if the fighting is halted and there is an agreement
to allow self-determination.
“War is hell” is both a cliché and a truism. We, as a species, should have
outgrown war centuries ago, but we must start where we are and work with what
we have. Right now, we have a war that seems intractable, while crying out for a
just settlement and peace. This conflict is one that we cannot afford to
ignore, especially since, unlike many conflicts, this one holds to potential of
going nuclear.
